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RECENT CASE
INTOXICATING LIQUOR - PERSONS LIABLE - A SOCIAL HOST WHO
FURNISHES ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES TO AN OBVIOUSLY INTOXICATED
PERSON MAY BE HELD ACCOUNTABLE TO THIRD PERSONS WHO ARE
FORESEEABLY INJURED.
James Coulter was a passenger in a car which struck an
abutment.1 Coulter and his wife, petitioners, brought an action
against the owner and the manager of an apartment complex where
the driver of the car had consumed alcoholic beverages. 2 The
petitioners alleged the defendants were negligent3 when they served
alcohol to the driver of the car, whom they should have known was
excessively intoxicated.4  Additionally, they contended the
defendants knew the driver would be driving following
consumption of the alcohol, therefore, exposing others to a
foreseeable risk of harm. 5 The trial court granted a demurrer
requested by the defendants. 6 Petitioners sought a mandate to
overturn the trial court decision and send the case to trial. 7 The
1. Coulterv. SuperiorCourt ofSan Mateo County, 21 Cal.3d 144, 147, 577 P.2d 669, 671, 1.,5
Cal. Rptr. 534, 535 (1978).
2. Id. at 147, 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
3. The California statute provided that "[e]very person who sells, furnishes, gives or causes to
be sold, furnished, or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to
any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE§ 25602
(West 1964). The California Supreme Court has stated that this statute was enacted to protect
members of the general public against injuries resulting from intoxication. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal.3d
153, 165, 486 P.2d 151, 159, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623, 631 (1971).
The Court of Appeals of California used the logic of Vesely to conclude that any person who
disregards a legislative mandate breaches a duty to anyone who is injured as a result of a minor's
intoxication and for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24
Cal. App. 3d 87, 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 756 (1972).
The California Supreme Court stated Vesety put the legislature on notice that this statute
could form a basis for imposition of civil liability upon social hosts. This, combined with the
legislative desire to liberally construe the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, affords a sufficient
statutory basis upon which civil liability may be imposed on a noncommercial supplier who provides
alcoholic beverages to an obviously intoxicated person. 21 Cal.3d at 151, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal.
Rptr. at 538.
See the language in the N. D. Century Code which provides that, -[a]ny person delivering
alcoholic beverages to a person under twenty-one years of age, an habitual drunkard, an
incompetent, or an intoxicated person is guilty ofa class A misdemeanor. N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-
01-09 (1975).
4. 21 Cal. 3d at 147. 577 P.2d at 671, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
5. Id.
6. Id. The demurrer was granted, presumably, because the plaintiff failed to state a cause of
action.
7. Id. Apparently mandate was sought because the trial court deprived the Coulters of an
opportunity to plead their cause of action.
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California Supreme Court held that a social host, as distinguished
from a commercial host, who furnishes intoxicating liquor to a
guest who is obviously intoxicated, may be held liable to third-
parties who are injured by the guest when there is a reasonably
foreseeable risk of harm. 8 Coulter v. Superior Court of San Mateo
County, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
At common law there was not a cause of action in favor of one
injured by an intoxicated person against the furnisher of the
intoxicating liquor. 9 It was felt the consumption rather than the sale
of the alcohol was the proximate cause of any subsequent injury. 10
In Cole v. Rush, 11 the defendant had been requested by plaintiff not
to serve her husband any intoxicating beverages. Plaintiff brought
suit after the defendant ignored the request and plaintiff's husband
was killed in a subsequent brawl. 12 The Supreme Court of
California dismissed the suit because contributory negligence
barred recovery, pointing out that consumption of the liquor was
the proximate cause of injuries from its use and contributed to any
injury. 13
In response to harsh court decisions based on common law and
to provide a remedy which the common law did not grant, 14 "dram
shop" acts were enacted. 15 These acts, however, imposed liability
only on sellers of alcohol.1 6 Despite statutory limitations, recent
decisions have extended the provisions of the dram shop acts to
social hosts. 7 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in allowing an
8. Id.
9. Megge v. United States, 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965);
Kingen v. Weyant, 148 Cal. Appl 2d 656, 307 P.2d 369 (1957); Sworski v. Colman, 204 Minn. 474,
283 N.W. 778(1939).
10. Car v. Turner, 238 Ark. 889, 385 S.W.2d 656 (1965); Hull v. Rund, 150 Colo. 425, 374
P.2d 351 (1962); Meade v. Freeman, 93 Idaho 389, 462 P.2d 54 (1969); Cowman v. Hansen, 250
Iowa 358, 92 N.W.2d 682 (1958); Lee v. Peerless Ins. Co., 248 La. 982, 183 So. 2d 328 (1966);
Hamm v. Carson City Nugget, Inc., 85 Nev. 99,450 P.2d 358 (1969); Hall. v. Budagher, 76 N.M.
591, 417 P.2d 71 (1966); Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis.2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
11. 45 Cal. 2d 345. 289 P.2d 450 (1955).
12. Cole v. Rush, 45 Cal.2d 345, 347, 289 P.2d 450, 451 (1955).
13. Id. at 356, 289 P.2d at 457.
14. Megge v. U.S., 344 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 831 (1965); Cherbonnier
v. Rafalovich, 88 F. Supp. 900 (D. Alas. 1950); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 226 A.2d 383
(1967): Howlett v. Doglio, 402 111. 311, 83 N.E.2d 708 (1949).
15. Through dram shop acts, legislatures sought to protect the health, safety and welfare of the
public by regulating the distribution of liquor and providing remedies for injured parties which did
not exist at common law. ABA SECT. OF INs., NEG. & COMP. LAW, 448 (1967). See generally Note,
Liability Under theMinnesota Civil DamageAct, 46 MINN. L. REV. 169, 170 (1962).
16. Butsee Williams v. Klemesrud. 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972): Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 155,
200 NW.2d 149 (1972).
17. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972): Ross v. Ross. 294 Minn. 115, 200
N.W.2d 149 (1972).
But of Miller v. Owens-Ill. Glass Co.. 48 Ill, App. 2d 412, __ 199 N. E.2d 300, 306
(1964) (the court found the purpose of the dram shop act was to regulate those in business, not the
souial drinker): LaGault v. Klebba. 7 Mich. App. 640, __, 152 N. W.2d 712, 713 (1967) (the
court held that it is not the law that private persons are liable for the actions of their social guests who
over-indulge in liquid hospitality at private homes or parties): Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237,
RECENT CASE
action against a non-commercial purveyor of liquor, concluded that
all those who furnish liquor to others should be responsible for
protecting innocent third parties from the potential dangers of
furnishing such hospitality indiscriminately. 18 The Iowa Supreme
Court also rejected such a statutory construction because it would
have limited the scope of the dram shop statute. 19 The Iowa Court
arrived at this conclusion by liberally construing the statute. 20 The
North Dakota Supreme Court has strictly interpreted a portion of
North Dakota's dram shop act, 21 regardless of the desire of the
__ , 310 A.2d 75, 76 (1973)(the court declined to impose civil liability on nonlicensed persons
who furnish intoxicants without payment).
18. Ross v. Ross, 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972). A minor had his brother purchase
alcohol for him. Thereafter an accident occurred and the minor was killed. His wife brought an
action against the brother basing the claim on the following statute:
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person ... has a
right of action, in his own name, against any person who, by illegally selling, bartering
or giving intoxicating liquors, caused the intoxication of such persons, for all damages,
sustained;...
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972).
The Minnesota Supreme Court made a lengthy review of the conditions under which the
act was adopted. From this survey the court determined the legislature clearly intended the act
should apply to everyone who violated it. Id. at 121, 200 N. W.2d at 150.
19. Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614 (Iowa 1972).
20. Id. at 615. A minor had a friend of age purchase alcohol for him. The minor became
intoxicated and was then involved in an automobile accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The
suit relied on statutory language which provided the following:
Every .... person who shall be injured in person or property .... by any intoxicated
person ... shall have a right of action ... against any person who shall, by selling or
giving to another contrary to the provisions of this title any intoxicating liquors, cause
the intoxication of such person, for all damages actually sustained, as well as
exemplary damages.
IOwA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West 1949).
The Supreme Court of Iowa viewed such statutes to be compensatory. It rejected a strict
construction because it would have limited the scope of the act, impaired the remedy of the statute'
and advanced the mischief sought to be corrected. 197 N.W.2d at 615.
The North Dakota Century Code also provides for liberal construction of statutes:
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation thereof are to be
construed strictly has no application to this code. The code established the law of this
state respecting the subjects to which it relates, and its provisions and all proceedings
under it are to be construed liberally, with a view to effecting its objects and to
promotingjustice.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-01 (1975).
21. Jore v. Saturday Night Club, Inc., 227 N.W.2d 889 (N.D. 1975). The suit arose when the
plaintiff's decendent attended a party at a motel. Another party-goer, Coss, left with a friend to go to
defendant's bar where they had beer and purchased a twelve-pack of beer. They returned to the
party. Thereupon plaintiff's decedent went for a motorcycle ride with Coss and was killed in an
accident. It was determined Coss had a blood alcohol level of 0.10, which made him legally
intoxicated.
The suit relied on statutory language providing as follows:
Every wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who shall be
injured in person, property or means of support by any intoxicated person, or in
consequence of intoxication, shall have a right of action against any person who shall
have caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away
alcoholic beverages contrary.to statute for all damages sustained.
N. D. CENT. CODE 5-01-06 (1975).
Compare N. D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 with IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 note 20 supra.
The court dismissed an interpretation which would equate "intoxication" with "under the
influence of intoxicating liquor" because the later has a specialixed, well-defined meaning which
would indicate that, because it was omitted, the legislature did not intend to embody its meaning
within the statute. 227 N.W.2d at 895.
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legislature to have statutes interpreted liberally.
22
In addition to statutory construction, courts have utilized the
concept of negligence per se, 23 based on the violation of a duty'
imposed by liquor control statutes, 24 to impose liability on servers
of alcoholic beverages. A case supporting this theory is Brockett v.
Kitchen Boyd Motor Co. 25  where a minor employee became
intoxicated at a company Christmas party. The minor was placed
in his car by the employer and instructed to drive home. The minor
struck plaintiff with his car and injured him. 26 Plaintiff sued the
employer; however, the trial court sustained a demurrer by the
defendant. On appeal, the court concluded that any person who
violates a statute breaches a duty to anyone who is injured as a
result of the minor's intoxication and for whose benefit the statute
was enacted.
27
Other courts have used common law negligence principles
when analyzing such cases. 28 The duty was found to arise from
conditions which the social host should realize are dangerous. 29 A
list of factors was utilized in Coulter to determine whether a duty
existed between a social host and a third person injured by a
22. N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-02-01, note 20 supra.
23. Once a statute is interpreted as being designed to protect the class of persons in which the
plaintiff is included against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a result of a
violation of the statute, most courts hold that an unexcused violation of the statute is conclusive on
the issue of negligence and the court must so direct the jury. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS S 36 (4th
ed. 1971).
24. Wavnick v. Chicago's Last Dept. Store, 269 F.2d 322 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S.
903 (1960); Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969): Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d
153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d
87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972): Davis v. Shiappacossee, 155 So.2d 364 (Fla. 1963); Elder v. Fisher,
247 Ind. 598. 217 N.E.2d 847 (1966): Brattain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150
(1974): Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 189 (Iowa 1977); Adamian v. Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498,
233 N.E.2d 18 (1968): Ramsev v. Anctil. 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900 (1965); Rappapart v.
Nichols. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959); Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 290
(1965); Mitchell v. Kettner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1965).
But of Nitschke v. Barnick. 226 N. W.2d 785 (N. D. 1975)(the court held violation of a
statute is evidcnce of negligence, although not negligence as a matter of law).
25. 24Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1972).
26. Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Notor Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 88, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752, 753
(1972).
27. Idat 93. 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756. The court's decision was based upon Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d
153. 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971), in which the Supreme Court of California said in
California "'A presumption of negligence arises from the violation ofa statute which was enacted to
protect a class of persons of which the person (plaintiff) is a member against the type of harm which
the plaintiff suffered as a result of the violation of the statute.' Id. at 164, 486 P.2d at 159, 95 Cal.
Rptr. at 631. The court determined. by interpretation of § 25602. the statute was enacted for the
purpose of protecting members of the general public against injuries resulting from intoxication. Id.
at 165, 486 P.2d at 159.95 Cal. Rptr. at 631.
28. 21 Cal. 3d 144. 577 P.2d 669. 145 Cal. Rptr. 534: Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chap. of Alpha
Tau Omega Frat.. 258 Or. 632. 485 P.2d 18(1971).
29. 21 Cal. 3d at 154. 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540. The court said intoxicating liquor
causes many outward manifestations which are plain and easily seen or discovered. Id. at 155, 577
P.2d at 675. 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540. In Wiener the court stated a host has a duty to deny further
alcohol to guests who are alteadv severely intoxicated, whose behavior the host knows to be
unusualiy affected b alcohol. or who are minors. 258 Or. at __ . 485 P.2d at 21.
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guest. 30 The list included foreseeability, certainty of the injury,
causal connection, moral blame, preventing future harm, burden
on the defendant, consequences to the community and the
availability of insurance. 31 The Coulter court applied these factors to
find that a duty existed under both statutory and common law. 32 In
addition, the Coulter court pointed to statistics regarding drunk
drivers in California 33  and used the statistics to show the
foreseeability of harm from the combination of drinking and
driving. 34 This relationship has been recognized by other courts as
the basis of their decisions to allow recovery from sellers of alcoholic
beverages.
35
While these cases have generally dealt with sellers of liquor,
Coulter applied the same principle to the social host. 36 Any person who
discovers another in such an intoxicated condition that he has lost
control of his sense of responsibility to others has a common law
duty to stop pouring alcohol into the other. 37 This stems from the
rationale that danger to society from that individual38 is equally as
great regardless of the source of liquor and equally foreseeable to a
reasonably perceptive host as to a bartender.3 9 This view is
30.21 Cal. 3d at 153, 577 P.2d at 74, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
31. Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113,443 P.2d 561, 564, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100(1968).
32.21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534.
33. Id. at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
34. In 1975 there were 508,723 males and 45,879 females arrested for drunken driving in the
United States. The figures in 1970 were 340,873 males and 24,394 females. INFORMATION PLEASE
ALMANAC 783 (1978). The California court suggested many drunken drivers are not apprehended
and that arrests may only be the tip of the iceberg. 21 Cal. 3d at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr.
at 540.
35. See Deeds v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 348 (D. Mont. 1969). The court stated the
following:
The increasing frequency of serious accidents caused by drivers who are
intoxicated is a fact which must be well known to those who sell and dispense liquor.
This lends support to those cases which have found the automobile accident to be 'the
reasonably foreseeable' result of furnishing liquor to the intoxicated driver, at least
where the person furnishing the liquor knew that the intoxicated person would be
driving on a public highway.
Id. at 358.
See Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc. 2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965). The Berkeley courq
explained that when the problem of drunk driving developed the car was still an idea, modern
highway traffic unimaginable and taverns patronized by the local citizenry or travelers in horse
drawn vehicles, while "[today], the hazards of travel by cars on modern highways has become a
national problem. The drunken driver is a threat to the safety of many " Id. at __, 262 N.Y.S.
2d at 293.
Seealso Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151,95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971); Adamian v.
Three Sons, Inc., 353 Mass. 498, 233 N.E.2d 18 (1968); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188. 156
A.2d I (1959); Mitchell v. Ketner, 54 Tenn. App. 656, 393 S.W.2d 755 (1964); Garcia v. Hargrove,
46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970)(Hallows. C.J., dissenting).
36. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534. The court required the furnishing to be
an affirmative act. Id. at 155,577 P.2d at 
6 76
, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 581.
37. Jardine v. Upper Darby Lodge No. 1973, Inc., 413 Pa. 626, __, 198 A.2d 550, 553
(1964).
38. Such a person is unable to exercise normal powers of judgment and prudence. Soronen v.
Olde Milford Inn, 84 N.J. Super. 372, -, 202 A.2d 208, 209 (1964).
39. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534. Butcf Cherbonnier v. Rafalovich, 88 F.
Supp. 900 (D. Alaska 1950)(the fact the bartender may have sold the patron a drink while the latter
was intoxicated is not sufficient, by itself, to make the bartender or his master liable).
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supported by the Restatement (Second) of Torts.4 0
In determining that social hosts may be liable for the
consequences following from serving alcohol to guests who are
already intoxicated 41 the court in Coulter expressed the belief that
the potential hazards to life and limb caused by drunken drivers
outweigh any burdens the rule places on society. 42 However, other
courts have been unwilling to impose such liability fearing such an
extension would be a step too far;43 one which should be left to the
legislature.4 4 No undue burden, however, is imposed by asking a
social host to exercise due care to protect an intoxicated guest from
himself and the public in general from such a guest.
4 5
There is. no reasonable excuse for distinguishing between the
liability of a commercial supplier and a social host.4 6 Imposing
common law liability on the social host is but another method
4 7 of
attempting to ensure the safety of our highways.4 8 The California
Supreme Court was forced to resort to common law to impose civil
liability on servers of alcoholic beverages4 9 because California has
no dram shop act. In Coulter a criminal statute was interpreted so as
to allow a civil recovery.
50
The courts of North Dakota, however, will not be faced with
such a problem. The legislature of North Dakota has provided both
criminal51 and civil 52 statutes which permit actions against servers
of alcoholic beverages. The criminal statute grants the state a
means of punishing anyone who furnishes liquor to an intoxicated
person. 53 The civil statute, or dram shop act, provides a remedy
40. "An act or an omission may be negligent if the actor realizes or should realize that it
involves an unreasonable risk or harm to another through the negligent or reckless conduct of the
other or a third person." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS S 302A (1965).
41. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534.
42. Id. at 154, 577 P.2d at 675, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 540.
43. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970). The court stated "such a
(restriction of social activity encompasses changes far beyond the framework of negligence law
previously interpreted and applied by this court." Id. at 734, 176 N.W.2d at 571.
44. Holmes v. Circo, 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976): Edgar v. Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100,
375 N.Y.S. 2d 548 (1975).
45. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. at __. 156 A.2d at 10; Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d at
739, 176 N.W.2d at 573 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
46. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724. 176 N.W.2d 566. "[If] the act of providing liquor to
one already intoxicated is a negligent act. then it remains a negligent act regardless of who the
supplier may be." Id. at 734. 176 N.W.2d at 571.
47. Dram shop acts and liquor control statutes are the others.
48. "Ifwe are looking for a deterrent for drinking, sole liability of the drunk driver will not deter
as eltectivelv as liability for selling liquor to an inebriate-one cannot drink if no one will sell or giho,-
him liquor." 46 Wis. 2d at 740, 176 N.W.2d at 574.
49. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
50. Id. See supra note 3.
51. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975). supra note 3.
52. See id. § 5-01-06 (1967). supra note 21.
53. See id. § 5-01-09 (1
9 7
5). supra note 3.
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against people who furnish liquor contrary to statute5 4 for persons
injured by an intoxicated person.55 Therefore, North Dakota courts
would not have to rely on an expansion of the criminal statute to
grant a civil remedy.
Just as California has provided a civil remedy for its
citizens, 56 North Dakota should extend its civil remedy under its
dram shop act57 to include social hosts. Such an extension is needed
to protect ordinary citizens from the danger created by drunken
drivers. In fact, there may be more need for such protection in
North Dakota as the state's roads are more dangerous than in
California.5" While such an application may impose some
restrictions on social merrymaking, it must be but a secondary
consideration when compared to the savings of human lives on our
highways.
DOUGLAS A. BOESE
54. The phrase "contrary to statute" as stated in 5 -01-06 must be read as meaning those
persons listed in § 5-01-09, which would include an already intoxicated person.
55. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1967), supra note 21. The statutory language of North
Dakota's dram shop act is not limited to sellers of alcoholic beverages. The statute includes "any
person who shall have caused such intoxication by disposing, selling, bartering, or giving away alcoholic
beverages .... Id. (emphasis added).
56.21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
57. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-06 (1967), supra note 21.
58. THE WORLD ALMANAC 954 (1978). The number of motor vehicle deaths per hundred million
vehicle miles in California in 1976 was 3.2; in North Dakota in 1976 the figure was 3.9. Id. These
figures may be deceiving because of the different conditions with which drivers of the respective
states must contend. A large part of the driving in North Dakota takes place on high speed, over
unprotected stretches of road, over gravel roads, and, for a good portion of the year, while snow and
ice cover the roads. California drivers, while facing more crowded roads and city driving, generally
do not have to face the challenge of gravel roads and ice-coated roads.
